In the beginning, President Obama wanted a grand bargain for $4 trillion in debt reduction over 10 years along with some small revenue increases. This deal doesn't have the revenue increases, but the spending cuts are also much less than in the grand bargain. The core of the cuts are something that would have been there regardless of whether or not there were revenue increases; the revenue increases were in there to sweeten the pot for even more spending cuts. The deal convenes a deficit commission that is very likely to pass through some revenue increases, or otherwise trigger automatic spending cuts that are mostly defense spending cuts. And defense spending should be cut at every possible chance: the US spends more on the military now than at any point during the height of the Cold War. See this graph from the Center for American Progress (or this one from the Heritage Foundation).
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Meanwhile, the US economy is on pins and needles, since there was never a recovery from the last recession. Demand is weak, GDP is well below potential output, and employment never recovered, leading to a seemingly-permanent decline in trend GDP and the employment/population ratio. After the end of monetary stimulus in QE2, the softening economic numbers seem to be headed back towards recession.
And the really worrying problem continues to be the Eurozone. The deal announced July 22 to finally bring Greece into technical default, seems to have helped Greece, Ireland, and Portugal, but the Eurofail seems to be infecting Spain and Italy as badly as ever. As US manufacturing hit its lowest level in two years, the Eurozone is still collapsing.
It looks like the Italy-Germany bond spread is 2011's TED spread, but Spanish 10-year bonds are another measure of contagion.
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